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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJtah 
ROBERrr IL HINCKLEY, INC., 
a corporation, 
vs 
STArrE 'I1AX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff, 
' 
Defendant. 
STATEMENrr OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a statutory proceeding in which the De-
fendant Tax Commission seeks to impose upon Plain-
tiff Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. (hereafter "Hinckley") 
deficiency assessments for Sales and Use Taxes, with 
~nalty and additional or "penalty" interest there-
on. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
After notice of the alleged deficiencies, Hinckley 
paid all of the Use Tax and a part of the Sales Tax 
demanded thereby, with ordinary interest upon both. 
It denied that it was liable for any penalty, penalty 
interest, or the unpaid balance of the claimed Sales 
Tax. On hearing, the rrax Commission sustained the 
claims for additional sales tax and for penalty and 
Penaltv interest on both Sales and Use Tax. Hinckley 
lhen procured a Writ of ReYiew herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIE\V 
Hinckley seeks a judgement of this Court vacating 
( 1) the deficiency for Sales Tax not collected or re-
mitted, (2) the assessment of venalty and penalty 
interest on Sales Tax, and ( 3) the assessment of penalt·,. 
and pen,alty interest on Use Tax, or, that failin~, 
an order for a new hearing on the issues relating to 
penalty. 
STA1'EMENT OF FACTS 
Many of the relevent facts were stipulated in writing. 
(R 108-112.) The following numhered paragraphs are 
taken from that stipulation. 
1. Robert H. Hinckley, Inc., (hereinafter called Hin-
ckley) is a corporation of Utah. Its place of brn;ines~ 
is at 2810 Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Weber 
County, Utah. 
2. For many years Hinckley has operated as a 
wholesale and retail dealer in motor vehicles and motor 
vehicle parts and accessories, and has operated a garage 
for the repair and service of said vehicles. It has for 
some time conducted a business of retailing boats and 
boat accessories. During all times here involved, it hai 
also conducted, under the trade name of "K wik Kafe' of 
Utah" the business of retailing coffee, orange drink. 
chocolate and other soft drinks by and through auto-
matic, coin operated vending machines. During a part 
of the period involved it has also sold at retail through 
similar machines candy, cigarettes, soup, sandwiches 
and other foods. 
3. During all of these times Hinckley has been 
2 
.. 
July licensed as a retailer under the Sales Tax Act of 
Ptah, and has conducted its business thereunder. 
+. rrhe said vending machines are all constructed 
in such manner that they automatically present and 
deliver one unit only of the vended commodity at a 
time upon insertion of the fixed price in United States 
coin. By reason of the mechanical limitations of such 
machines, each sale and delivery must be completed 
before the next coins will be accepted by the machine. 
Combined or multiple sales of two or more units are 
not possible. 
5. Further, Hinckley's vending machines are so 
<.:onstructed that they operate only upon fixed multi-
ples of five cents. They will not make change. 
6. All such coin operated vending machines re-
quire delicate adjustment in order to function properly. 
All available machines frequently get out of adjustment 
and out of order and fail to function. Constant inspection 
and maintenance is necessary. Under the best circum-
stances vending machines are frequently out of service 
because of maladjustments in the coin operating mech-
anisms. 
7. The Tax Commission has not, during the period 
involved, authorized or made available tax tokens, tax 
stamps, or any other device by which the correct sales 
tax at two percent, two and one-half percent or three 
percent, as the case may be, may be paid, collected or 
!'emitted on sales where the price or consideration 
thereon is only five cents or ten cents as aforesaid. 
There are no machines for the issuance of any such 
tokens or stamps, or which will operate upon the use 
3 
of either thereof. During the period of time involved 
there was- and now is no known way that Hinckley\ 
can collect the tax from the purchaser in such tran-
sactions without collecting at least one cent on eaeh 
sale or paying the tax itself. The sales here involved are 
sales at a price of five cents and ten cents. The United 
States of America issues no coins in denominations 
less than one cent. 
8. The period of time involved is July 1, 1959, to 
.June 30, 1962, inclusive. During that time Hinckley has 
reported sales of more than $2,900,000.00 to the Utah 
State Tax Commission and collected, reported and paid 
to the Commission sales tax on all of said sales. It 
has paid sales tax on all sales on which the consideration 
or purchase price charged or received has been in ex-
cess of fourteen cents. 
9. Hinckley has not collected, reported or re-
mitted sales tax on its sales made through such vending 
machines where the amount of such sale was five cents 
or ten cents. 
10. Upon audit of Hinckley's books and records 
for the said period of time, and on being advised 
by Hinckley that it had not collected or remitted sales 
tax on said sales for a consideration of five cents or 
ten cents, the auditing division of the Tax Commission 
of Utah assessed against Hinckley deficiencies for sales 
tax thereon in the total sum of $8,847.82, with penalty 
thereon at the rate of 10%, and interest at the rate 
of 1 % per month. Thereafter, Hinckley paid taxes, 
together with 6 % interest per annum on those sales 
over ten cents per sale, leaving a balance of $7,086.65. 
The Tax Commission has assessed in addition thereto 
4 
a penalty at the rate of 10'/< and interest at the rate 
of 1 ~Ir per month. 
11. Early in the course of its operation of said 
vending machines, Hinckley became aware of the legal 
problem involved in the making of many individual 
sales for five cents and ten cents through -said ma-
!'hines, and, in the exercise of due care, retained attor-
neys skilled in the law and duly licensed to practice 
law in Utah before all of the courts of the State of 
Utah, and requested the opinion of such attorneys as 
to whether, under the law and regulations applicable, 
Hinckley was obligated to collect and remit sales tax 
on sales of five cents and ten cents made as aforesaid 
through said vending machines. Hinckley was duly fur-
nished with the opinion of said attorneys, first orally 
and later confirmed in writing, to the effect that 
Hinc~kley had no such obligation under the law and the 
regulations. Hinckley relied on such opinion in making 
sales of candy and beverages through said vending ma-
chines at the established prices of five cents and ten 
cents without collecting or attempting to collect any 
tax from the purchaser-taxpayer. 
The sums in dispute are as follows: 
1. Penalty on Use Tax paid ________________________ $ 278.25 
2. Additional "penalty" interest 
on Use Tax to date of payment 
of principle -------------------------------------------- 862.92 
3. Sales Tax unpaid, arising from 
5c and lOc vending machine sales ________ 7,086.05 
-±. Penalty on Sales Tax unpaid 
and Sales Tax paid late ------------------------ 1,012.98 
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5. Interest to September 15, 1964, 
on Sales Tax claimed, (including 
regular interest on unpaid por-
bon and "penalty" interest on 
the portion paid.) ------------------------------------ 3,117.57 
(R 114 to 116; 180-181) 
Between September 15, 1964 and October 28, 1964, 
interest at 1 % per month on the unpaid Sales Tax 
amounted to $97.85. On the latter date Hinckley de-
posited the total of all these sums with the Tax Comm-
ission, preparatory to this review. 
In the administration of the Sales Tax, the Comm-
ission has followed a policy of collecting, from the ven-
dor, Sales Tax on all sales, including even those at less 
than 15c, with respect to which the tax collectable from 
the vendee-consumer js, by the Commission's Regu-
lations, "none." ( R 15 and 17 to 18). "As far as the 
administration is concerned" the Commission looks upon 
the vendor as the taxpayer. (R 18, lines 15 to 21. Em-
phasis supplied) 
The "bracket system" (with which the Commiss-
ion in 1951 replaced sales tax tokens) was designed to 
return the correct amount on total sales in the state 
over a period of time, but does not authorize or con-
template that the correct tax will be collected from the 
vendee-consumer in any particular transaction, and 
no tax ("none") can be collected on sales of 5c and lOc, 
even though the Tax Commission expects the collec-
ting agent-vendor to pay tax based on receipts from 
such sales. (R 20-22; 5, page 36, Reg. 6; and Exhibit 6, 
page 73, Reg. 3.) But notwithstanding the design and 
6 
intention of the Commission, under the bracket system 
the majority of merchants do not collect as much ta.r 
us I Ji e Co mrnission requires them to pay to the State. 
(R 23) 
And every vendor pncmg his goods in the upper 
one-half of a bracket would collect less tax than the 
Connnission would require him to remit. (R 42 and 43). 
With respect to the imposition of penalty and pen-
alty interest, the Commission's auditors and super-
visors are orally instructed to impose or recommend 
the imposition of these penalties whenever the "tax-
payer" (or "collecting agent." See Ex. 4; Appendix 
No. 6 hereto) has not complied with written rules 
and regulations as put out by the Commission; the 
instructions hold the Vendor to an absolute duty of 
care of complying with such regulations, so far as the 
auditor is concerned. (R 25) 
In this regard the Commission has no general 
or uniform written instructions defining "negligence" 
in failing to pay the tax. (R 23 and 24) Each case is 
handled by the auditors on its own facts, except, as 
above indicated. (R 25 and 22). Mr. Holt, Director of 
the Auditing Division, takes the position that in the 
light of publicity given regulations there are no excuses 
for the failure of Vendor by automatic vending mach-
ine to pay tax on sales through the machines. (R 31). 
In his opinion the fact that, as here, the Vendor acted on 
the advice of licensed legal counsel is insufficient to 
show "due <:>are" as opposed to "negligence." (R 32) 
rrhe auditing division customarily determines in 
the first instance whether or not a penalty will be 
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assessed, and waives the penalty in some ea::-;es. How-
ever, it never waives the penalty when a "taxpayer" 
exercises his right to request a formal hearing. (R 34 
to 35) 
Hinckley contended that the effect of this policy 
was to penalize a citizen for any attempt to seek legal 
redress of a grievance by due process of law, and 
unlawfully to impede and harass one who seeks to have 
his "day in court" before submitting to disputed find-
ings and assessments of the auditing division; that it 
becomes a "bludgeon" held over the heads of citizens 
to compel them to submit. It sought discovery (sta-
tistically only) into the records of the Commission in 
the expectation that it would disclose that in practice 
the policy punishes those citizens who seek legal re-
dress against assessments deemed unlawful, ·while wai-
vers of penalty reward the submissive. All discovery 
and information on this line was refused. (R 35-41) 
Hinckley contends that this has denied it due proces8 
of law and equal protection of law as regards the 
claimed penalty and penalty interest. 
Hinckley has been in business 49 years. (R 49) John 
S. Hinckley has been manager for 16 years. (R 46 and 47) 
It is a substantial business, employing some 40 people, 
and paying sales tax on more than $2,900,000.00 in 
sales over the three year audit period. (R 47 and 110) 
The management has been aware of the problems 
involved in multiple returns for taxes and contributions 
to various governmental units. Its policy has been to 
retain people speciall~- trained in the tax field and 
instruct them to rnake appropriate returns, and to pa~· 
every bit of taxes due, and that the company was not 
8 
trying to avoid payment of anything. Accordingly, 
as regards the vending machine operation in this case, 
it employed l\Ir. William R. Stockdale, a C.P.A. and 
so instructed him. The manager has no training or 
skill in these matters. (R 50 to 52) 
When the question arose as to sales tax on vending 
machine sales at prices below the lowest "tax col-
lection" bracket, under apparently conflicting regula-
tions, the management obtained and followed legal coun-
8el. (R 110-111, paragraph 11 of the stipulation of 
facts above quoted.) 
With respect to the Use Tax penalties, the record 
shows without dispute that for years little or no machin-
ery or supplies used by Hinckley was purchased out-
side the state. When Hinckley entered the coffee vending 
machine business, and purchased the machines from 
outside Utah, the personnel of the company simply 
overlooked the fact that this was, for tax purposes, 
a different kind of transaction from the customary 
intra-state purchases of machinery and supplies, and 
consequently overlooked making the return and pay-
ing the tax. ( R 53 to 54; 69) The oversight occurred 
in spite of the fact that Hinckley's operation was 
conducted, as regards tax returns and payments, with 
more than ordinary care, in the opinion of the Certi-
fied Public Accountant, who also stated that in his 
opinion some errors in tax reporting are inevitable in 
a large business such as this one. (R 69, 70 and 89) 
Hinckley's vending machine business has been effi-
ciently run, but in some 9 years of operation it failed 
to make a profit; even before payment of the con-
9 
tested taxes. (Exh. 10, and R 76, 70 and 100) 
The C.P.A. stated (R 87) that it isn't possible 
that on the bracket system Hinckley's collections for 
sales tax would "average out" to the total sales tax 
claimed to be due. (R 87 and 90) 
Hinckley offered to prove that the vending machine 
business was highly competitive, with a low average 
margin of profit of about 2.5 % ; that the action of 
the Tax Commission in forcing machine vendors, alone 
among all other retailers, to absorb the sales tax, 
would force most operators out of business, and tend 
to create a monopoly. The offers was rejected. (R 100-
102) 
The decision of the Tax Commission (R 180 to 182) 
made no finding that any part of the claimed tax 
deficiencies was due to negligence or intentional dis-
regard of the acts or of authorized rules and regu-
lations, but nevertheless concluded that Hinckley was 
responsible for all of the 10 % penalties and all of 
the penalty interest, as well as for the contested por-
tion of the tax. It ordered that the proposed sales 
and use tax deficiencies be sustained. 
Hinckley thereupon applied for review by this court. 
While this Court will of course, take judicial no-
tice of the Tax Commission's official regulations and 
reports, for the convenience of the court in refreshing 
its judicial recollection copies thereof were included 
in the record, and the relevant portions reproduced 
in the appendices Nos. 1 through 8 hereto. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. The proposed assessment of additional sales 
tcu: on fi,ue-cent and ten-cent sales by vending mach-
ine is erroneous and unlawfid and should be abated. 
A. Statutory Construction. The Utah "Emergency 
Revenue Act of 1933" and "Use rrax Act of 1937" (here-
in ref erred to as the Sales Tax and Use Tax laws, 
respectively), as tax statutes, must be strictly construed 
against the taxing authority and liberally constr~ed 
in favor of Hinckley, against whom, as a private "tax 
collector," the proposed deficiencies and penalties are 
directed. This is a generally accepted, and, indeed, ele-
mentary principle of construction of taxing statutes. 
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Com. (1936) 
90 Utah 359, 61 Pac. 2d. 629, 107 A.L.R. 261. 
Pacific Intermountain Express v. State Tax Com-
( 1958) 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 Pac. 2d. 650. 
B. Since 1937, the Utah Sales Tax Act has placed), 
the legal and economic bitrden, of the sales t'OtX on thei 
vendee, and not on the vendor. 
The correctness of this statement is demonstrated 
hy a number of considerations. 
Let us first consider, briefly, the legislative his-
tory of the controlling provisions of the Sales Tax 
Act as it now exists. Some important changes have taken 
place. The original act appears as Chapter 63, Laws of 
Utah, 1933, (Regular Session.) It was immediately amen-
ded by Chapter 20, Laws of Utah, 1933 Second Spec-
ial Session. Section No. 4 of the Act, now appearing as 
Section 59-15-4, UCA, 1953, imposed "a tax upon 
every retail sale of tangible personal property" equi-
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valent to two per cent of the imrehase pnee paid or 
eharged. 
Section 5 of the Act (See Appendix No. 1) now 
appearing as Section 59-15-5, UCA, 1953, related to the 
collection of the tax. It provided that the vendor "shall 
be responsible for the collection of the amount of the 
tax imposed on said sale" and further provided that 
"the vendor niay, if he sees fit, collect the tax from the 
vendee, but in no case shall he collect as tax an amount 
(without regard to fractional parts of one cent) in 
excess of the tax computed at the rates prescribed by 
this act." (Emphasis supplied.)Section 5 further provid-
ed that "for the purposes of more efficiently f;ecuring 
the payment, collection, and accounting for the taxes 
provided for under this Act, the Tax Commission in 
its discretion, by proper rules and regulations, may pro-
vide for the issuance, affixing, and payment of revenue 
stamps." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Act further provided that "If any vendor 
shall, during any reporting period, collect as a tax 
an amount in excess of two per cent of his total taxable 
sales, he shall remit to the Commission the full amount 
of the tax herein imposed and also such excess .... " 
In 1936 this Court had occasion, twice, to consider 
the effect of these statutes as they then existed. 
State Tax Commission v. City of Logan, 
(1963) 88 Utah 406, 54 Pac. 2d. 1197. 
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
Supra. 
In those cases, the Supreme Court very properly 
and correctly held that the tax was a "transaction tax'' 
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levied upon the transaction of a retail sale. It held 
further that the statute then existing did not place the 
legal and economic burden of the tax separately upon 
either party to the transaction. It held, in effect, that 
the two parties to the sale were jointly and sever-
ally liable for the amount of the tax on the trans-
action, although by the provisions of Section 5 the 
vendor was granted the privilege of collecting the en-
tire tax (without regard to fractional parts of one 
cent) from the vendee. It also recognized that under 
those statutes the state looked primarily to the ven-
dor to account for and pay the proper amount of tax 
upon his taxable transactions during the reporting or 
accounting period. 
In the W. F. Jensen Candy Co. case, decided in 
October of 1936, the court was particularly concerned 
with the problem of sales of ten cents and five cents 
under practical difficulties of collecting the tax from 
the vendee in an isolated transaction where, in case of a 
nickel sale, the collection of a penny would have involved 
collection as tax in an amount ten times larger than 
that authorized by statute. The court commented that 
in meeting this practical difficulty, "the people appar-
ently have adopted the common-sense solution of the 
vendor absorbing the minor fraction of one cent, and 
the vendee paying when the sales tax upon the rate 
imposed passed to the major part of the fraction of 
a cent." The court also commented that the use of 
revenue ;stamps, tokens, and the carrying of debit 
and credit accounts whereby deficiencies or excesses 
would be erased over the reporting or accounting period, 
might be adopted as practical solutions to the problem, 
as between vendor and vendee. 
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The public uproar and protests over the inequalities 
of the then effective statute attracted the attention of 
the Commission, which noted the same in its 3rd Bi-
ennial Report, issued about the same time as the de-
cision in Jens en. ( Exh. 3; Appendix 2 of this brief.) 
Both retailers and consumers complained of injustice 
and serious practical difficulties. 
The 1937 Utah Legislature convened about three 
months after the W. F. Jensen Candy Co. case wa~ 
decided by the court. Upon considering what it had 
done in 1933, as interpreted by the Court, and upon 
considering protests reported by the Commission, the 
practical problems involved, and the Court's and the 
Commission's suggestions that tokens would provide 
a practical solution, the legislature amended Sectio11 
5 of the Act. See Chapters 111 and 112, Session Laws 
of Utah, 1937, and Appendix No. 3 hereto. 
As amended, the Section retained the provision 
that the vendor "shall be responsible for the collection 
of the amount of the tax imposed on said sales. . ." 
(Emphasis supplied.) However, the legislature changed 
the next clause, with respect to the collection of the 
tax, as indicated in the following quotation: 
"The vendor shall collect the tax from the vendee, 
but in no case shall he collect as tax an amount 
(without regard to fractional parts of one cent) 
in excess of the tax computed at the rates pre-
scribed by this act." 
In other words, the legislature substituted the imperative 
"shall" for the permissive "may if he sees fit." The 
legislative intent is clear and inescapable. The burden 
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of the tax is now legally and economically fixed upon 
the vendee and not the vendor. The vendor is now 
onl)· a collecting agent, not a taxpayer, and is liable 
only for failure to use due diligence and reasonable 
eare in performance of his duties of collecting. 
At the same time, following the Supreme Court's 
~rnggestion, and for the purpose of resolving the practi-
cal difficulties which were so apparent in W. F Jensen 
Candy Company, the legislature amended the provis-
ion in Section 5 relating to the use of revenue stamps 
in order to facilitate collection. The change is indicated 
in the following quotation, where the old provision is 
stricken and the new provisions are set out. 
"For the purpose of more efficiently securing 
the payment, collection and accounting for the 
taxes provided for under this Act, the Tax Com-
mission in its discretion, by proper rules and 
regulations, [may] shall provide [for the issuance, 
afixing, and payment of revenue stamps] issu-
ance of tokens or other appropriate devices to 
facilitate collections ... " (Bracketed words omit-
ted in amendment.) 
It must be noted that here again the legislature sub-
stituted the imperative "shall" for the permissive "may." 
It must be presumed that the legislature intended 
to accomplish something by these changes, and that 
it was not using words idly and without purpose or 
intent. These 1937 amendments have been continued 
through compilations and revisions to the present day. 
Their language is plain and unambiguous. The words 
are to be construed according to the approved usage 
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of the language. Sectio11 68-3-11, UCA 1953. 
Salt Lake Union Stockyards v. State rrax Com. 
( 1937) 93 Utah 166, 71 Pac. 2d. 538. 
In the light of the history of the legislation, and 
in the light of the words used with care and precision 
by the legislature, it is clear beyond any question that 
the 1937 amendments were intended by the legislature 
to fix, and they did fix, the legal and economic burden 
of the tax exclusively upon the vendee, and reduced the 
obligation of the vendor to that of a mere collection 
agent, an agent required only to perform his duties with 
reasonable diligence with the means provided. 
The Supreme Court of Utah and the courts of 
other states having statutes similar to the one pro-
duced by the 1937 amendments have construed those 
statutes as imposing the legal and the economic burden 
of the tax upon the vendee and not on the vendor. 
Lewis v. State Tax Commission (1950) 118 Utah 
72, 218 Pac. 2d. 107 4. 
Ralph Child Construction Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission 1961) 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 Pac. 2d 422. 
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission (1946) 
109 Utah 563, 168 Pac. 2d. 324. 
Nickerson Pump & Mach. Co. vs. State Tax Com. 
(1916) 12 Utah 2d. 30, 361 Pac. 2d. 520. 
Bedford v. Colorado National Bank (Colorado) 
91 Pac. 2d. 469. 
State ex rel. Foster v. Evatt (Ohio 1944) 56 
N.E. 2d 265, Certiorari denied, 324 U.S. 878. 
Blauner's Inc. v. City of Philadelphia (Penn. 
1938) 198 Atlantic 889. 
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'rhe Tax Connnission from 1937 until now has itself 
construed and applied the law as placing the legal and 
economic burden upon the vendee-consurner. On Juli'e 
7, 1937, within a few weeks after the effective date 
of the 1937 legislative amendments, the Tax Commis-
sion adopted its "Sales Tax Ruling No. 20" entitled, 
'"Subject: Mandatory Collection of Tax." It called 
attention to the amendment of Section 5 requiring that 
the ''vendor shall collect the tax from the vendee." (Em-
iJhasis by the Tax Commission). The Commission then 
ruled: 
"Under the act, as amended, the vendor is re-
quired to collect the tax from the vendee with 
respect to all transactions subject to tax. In 
all cases the tax must be added to the sales price 
and collected as a separate item. 
"It will be considered a violation of the Act for 
the vendor to absorb the tax or to consider that 
the tax is included and collected as a part of 
the sales price." 
'rhe 1959 and 1961 edition of the Commission's Regu-
lations contained similar provisions. (Exhibits 5 and 
6, Sales Tax Regulations Nos. 2 and 5, R 167; Appen-
dix No. 4.) The same provisions, in substance, are 
found in the 1963 Sales Tax Regulations. (Exh. 2) 
And in 1938, in its Fourth Biennial Report (Exh. 
4, Appendix, No. 6 ;) prepared after Regulation 57 
(Appendix, No. 5) attempting to change this rule, the 
Commission still recognized that the law had designated 
tlw vendee-commmer as the taxpayer, and fixed the 
burden of the tax on him. It further recognized that 
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the vendor-retailer was only a collecting agent for the 
state. 
Inasmuch as the above regulations have now heen 
in effect for some twenty-seven years, through some 
thirteen sessions of the legislature, they clearly es-
tablish the rule for which Hinckley here contends-if 
more than the statute itself were necessary to estab-
lish that rule. If there were any ambiguity in the 
statute as regards the actual tax payer, this has resolved 
it. See: 
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission (1946) 
109 Utah 563, 168 Pac. 2d. 324. 
It is clear then that the legal as well as the practical 
burden of the sales tax was intended to be, and in fact 
and in law it was and is imposed upon the vendee and 
not upon Hinckley and the other vendors of Utah. 
The Commission, however, was unwilling to accept 
the law from the elected legislative representatives 
of the people. Some months later it adopted its own 
administrative legislation, "Sales Tax Regulation 57," 
now, with some amendments, Regulation 74. (Appendix 
Nos. 5 and 7; Exhibits 5 and 6.) It provides that the 
"total receipts" of a vending machine operation are deem-
ed the "total selling price" of goods distributed thereby, 
and must be reported as the amount of sales subject 
to tax. Vendors are not permitted to fix the price of 
the goods sold at less than "total receipts." 
It is under this "executive self-help" legislation 
that the Commission claims authority for the sales 
tax assessment now being tested before this Court. (R 
181, paragraph 7,) 
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C. Sales Tax Regulations, and particularly Regula-
tion No. 74, by which the Tax Commission attempts 
lo transfer the legal and economic burden of the sales 
tax from the vendee to the vendor are void and in-
effective. 
'J1l1ere are several grounds, any one of which is 
sufficient to demonstrate the invalidity of such regu-
lations. Such regulations deny Hinckley and other re-
tailers similarly situated the equal protection of the 
law; would deprive Hinckley of property without due 
process of law; they are contrary to Utah Statutes, 
particularly the Sales Tax Act; and their promulgation is 
beyond the power and authority of the Commission. We 
shall discuss each of these propositions briefly. 
1 Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 2 and the 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, 
prohibit the state government from acting in any way 
which would deny to any person the equal protection 
of the laws. As we have seen, the law and valid regu-
lations in conformity therewith impose the legal and 
economic burden of the tax upon the vendee-consumer. 
It is unlawful for the vendor to absorb or in any way 
waive the collection or imposition of the tax or to con-
sider that the tax is included and collected as part of the 
sales price. (1937 Sales Tax Ruling No. 2, Sales Tax 
Regulations No. 5, 1961 Edition and No. 4, 1963 Edition. 
See Appendix Nos. 4, 6 and 7.) 
Although the Tax Commission since 19·37 has been 
required to provide "tokens or other appropriate de-
vices" as a means for the collection of the tax where 
the amount is less than one cent, in 1950 it withdrew 
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all tokens. (Exhibit 9; Appendix, No. 7, Reg. 6, and 
No. 8.) Since then there has been no method whatso-
ever by which a "vendor-collecting agent" could possi-
bly collect the correct amount of the sales tax on 
sales of five and ten cents. Accordingly, if the collecting 
agent collects any tax on a five-cent sale, he would 
have to collect approximately six to ten times the lawful 
amount of the tax - depending upon the rate in effect 
from time to time-inasmuch as a penny is the smallest 
available unit of payment. Similarly on a ten-cent sale, 
the tax collector, if he collects any tax at all, would 
be required to exact approximately three to five times 
the lawful tax from the vendee-taxpayer. In the light 
of the legislative requirement that tokens or similar 
devices be provided for payment of the correct amount 
of tax on such small sales, this is clearly unauthorized. 
The vendee-taxpayer is clearly entitled to refuse to 
submit to any such extortion under color of official 
right. The Supreme Court observed as much in W. F. 
Jensen Candy Co. Indeed, the exacting of an amount so 
far in excess of the actual tax would involve the tax 
collector and his accessories in the criminal offense 
of extortion. (Section 76-19-1 and 76-19-4 UCA 1953.) 
Apparently recognizing this fact, the Tax Com-
mission, in setting up its "bracket system" in 1950, has 
specifically provided that on sales for a consideration 
under fifteen cents, the amount of tax collected in "none." 
Sales Tax Regulations, 1959, 1961, and 1963, SectioriJ 6; 
Local Sales and Use Tax Regulations, 1961, and 1963, 
Section 3. (Appendix No. 7 and No. 8.) 
Accordingly, vendors who make manual delivery 
of gum, candy, coffee, or other commodities selling 
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for five or ten cents are not required by these regu-
Jatiom; to collect any tax from the taxpayer. As to 
them, t lie rrax Commission has taken the practical 
solution recognized in the Jensen case: waiving the 
tax as uncollectible where it amounts to a minor frac-
tion of a ('ent, but collecting a full penny where it amounts 
to a major fraction of a cent. However with respect 
to vendors who use vending machines to deliver the 
commodity niechanically, under Sales Tax Regulations 
Nus. 4 and 74, the situation is entirely different. Under 
those regulations, the Tax Commission has legislated 
and decreed that the total receipts from vending ma-
('hine operation "will be considered as the total selling 
price of the tangible personal property distributed in 
connection with their operations and must be reported 
as the amount of sales subject to tax," and that the 
vendor "is a guarantor of all amounts required to be 
collected under this act." It is recognized that the 
collection of the correct tax from the vendee is imposs-
ible, not only because, as above demonstrated, there 
now exists neither appropriate coinage nor tokens, but 
also because, as was stipulated, the vending machines 
will not operate except in multiples of five cents. Never-
theless, the Tax Commission, by Regulations 4 and 74 
and by its deficiency assessment, would compel the 
vendor-collector agent, Hinckley, to do the impossible, 
and for failure to do the impossible, to pay the tax 
itself. Thus, the Commission legislates that, as to ven-
ding machine operators only, the legal and economic 
burden of the tax shall be on the vendor and not on 
the vendee. 
rro select Hinckley and other vendors using auto-
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matic vending machines for snch speeial treatment 
denies them equal protection of the law. There is cer-
tainly no constitutional, legislative, or reasonable basis 
for the separate classification of vendors who make 
mechanical delivery of their goods as distinguished from 
vendors who make manual delivery of their good8 
when a sale is consumated. It is interesting to note 
that Regulation 7 4 associates vending machines with 
punch boards, a well-known gambling device, apparently 
on the theory that by forcing vending machines into 
this association, the vending machine operators will 
lose their constitutional rights by the guilt of such 
association. At any rate, the Tax Commission, in attempt-
to discriminate against a vendor who delivers by mech-
anical means, as distinguished from vendors who deliver 
manually, is clearly attempting to deny Hinckley the 
equal protection of the laws, and its regulations to 
that end are unconstitutional, void, and of no effect. 
In 1937 the Supreme Court of Utah had before it an 
identical legal problem in the case of 
Utah Light and Traction Co. v. State Tax Com. 
(1937) 92 Utah 404, 68 Pac. 2d 759. 
That case involved the question of whether the 
provision of Sales Tax Law exempting "street rail-
way fares" also exempted fares paid for transportation 
in street buses. It is apparent that the facts of Utah 
Light and Traction Co. are identical in principle with 
the facts of the case now before the Commission. Motor 
buses are manually steered while street cars are aitto-
matically steered by the rails. On the other hand, coffee 
sold bv a cafe operator is mannally delivered, while 
coffee . sold by an automatic vendor is mechanically 
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delivered. In Utah Light and Traction Co., the Utah 
court, in order to save the constitutionality of the 
statute, declared that the exemption for "street rail-
way fares" embraced motor bus fares. The court ob-
served, with respect to classification of street rail-
ways and motor buses: 
''If there is to be a classification, it, to he 
valid, must rest upon 'some ground of differ-
ence having a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation, so that all persons simil-
arly circumstanced shall be treated alike' .... 
Such a discrimination would be of doubtful 
validity." 
It is submitted that the Commission's attempt to 
discriminate between sales with manual delivery and 
sales ~with mechanical delivery is a discrimination with 
out a difference and is void for denial of equal protection 
of the law. Other cases support this conclusion. 
Howe v. Tax Commission of Utah (1960) 
10 Utah 2d. 362, 353 Pac. 2d. 468. 
Barker Bros. v. City of Los Angeles (California) 
67 Pac. 2d. 729, affirmed, 76 Pac. 2d 97. 
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Board of 
Commissioners of City of Camden (New Jersey) 
4 Atl. 2d 16. 
City of Seattle v. Deneker (Washington) 
108 Pac. 1086. 
Ex-Parte Richardson (California 1910) 
148 Pac. 213. 
Winslow - Spacarb, Inc. v. Evatt (Ohio 1945) 
59 N.E. 2d. 924. 
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Stewart Drygoods Co. v. Lewis (1935) 
294 U.S. 550. 
It is interesting to note that in Stewart Drygoods Co. 
the United States Supreme Court specifically held that 
ease of collection and administration does not justify 
discrimination or gross inequalities in the application 
of a tax law. The regulations and their attempted 
application to Hinckley by the Tax Commission in this 
case deny Hinckley the equal protection of the law, 
and are void. 
2. The Anditing Division's application of these 
regulations also deprives Hinckley of property (the 
claimed tax) without due process. 
As previously demonstrated, the clear intention 
of the legislature, since 1937, has been to make the 
sales tax the debt and obligation of the vendee-con-
sumer. rrhe vendor is merely the collecting agent. The 
Tax Commission, to simplify its problems of administra-
tion and collection, has attempted, and here attempts, 
by declaring Hinckley a "guarantor," to force Hinckley 
to pay and discharge the tax obligations of Hinckley's 
multitude of unknown vendees. In simple terms, the Tax 
Commission attempts, for convenience, to force A to 
pay the debt of B; that is, to take the property of A for 
the benefit of B. 
By a misconstruction and misapplication of the 
statutory provisions that the "vendor shall be respon-
sible for the collection of the tax," the Commission 
declares that Hinckley is a "guarantor" of an im-
possible performance, namely, the collection of a tax 
where no practical or possible device for collection 
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is available or provided. It is submitted that, upon the 
proper and required strict construction of this clause of 
th<' statute, it is impossible to construe the phrase 
''responsible for collection" to mean "guarantor of an 
impossible collection." This construction by the Tax 
Commission does violence to the clear meaning and 
intent of the legislature and to the accepted rules of 
statutory construction of tax statutes. It is one thing 
to impose upon a vendor the servitude of collecting 
tax without reimbursement, and quite another thing 
to make him a guarantor of an impossible collection 
and, thus, in the necessary and practical effect, shift 
to the collector the burden of paying the tax. 
The attempt runs head on into the due-process 
clause. This proposition is firmly established by judic-
ial authority. 
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. 
(1937) 300 U.S. 55, 77-80, 81 L. Ed. 510, 522-524. 
Weish v. Sells (Indiana) 192 N.E. 2d. 753, modi-
fied on rehearing 193 N. E. 2d 359. 
National Ice & Cold Stg. Co. v. Pacific Fruit 
Express Co. (California 1938) 79 Pac. 2d 380. 
Perhaps it should be noted that the regulations 
promulgated purport to make the vendor a guarantor 
only of amoimts "reqitired to be collected." On sales 
of le8s than fourteen cents, no tax is required to be 
collected. Therefore, the vendor, and particularly Hinck-
ley, is not by the terms of the regulation a guarantor 
of these particular amounts; and hence, the proposed 
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deficiency assessment is improper under the regula- 1 
tion. In this connection, the Indiana Court in Welsh v. 
Sells, supra~ interpreted that state's sales tax (which i 
made vendor collection agent for the state), as not 
being intended to apply to sales where the tax thereon 
would amount to less than one-half cent, and there- 1 
fore practically uncollectible. This the Indiana Court 
did in order to save the law against a charge that it 1 
deprived the seller of his property without due process. 
The court stated that such construction was necessary 
in order to reach the conclusion that the law was 
constitutional under the due-process clause. 
Hinckley is not, and cannot constitutionally be 
made a guarantor of the collection of this practically 1 
uncollectable tax. If the regulations purport to make 
Hinckley such guarantor, they are unconstitutional and 
void as depriving Hinckley of liberty and property 
without due process of law. 
3. The regulations and acts of the Tax Commis-
sion attempting to fix the liability for sales tax upon 
Hinckley are void as contrary to the law, and particularly 
the Sales Tax Act as enacted by the legislature. What 1 
has been said before clearly establishes that the Sales 
Tax Act places the legal and economic burden of the 
tax upon the vendee and mot on the vendor. The 
regulations purporting to place the legal and economic 
burden on the vendor and not on the vendee are dia-
metrically opposed to the statute and, of course, must 
fall before the higher law. 
We think it proper to point out that under the theory 
the Tax Commission seeks to apply to Hinckley, the 
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members of the C01111lli::·rnion, being responsible under 
tiw :statutes for the administration of tax laws and 
tl1e eollection of taxes, are themselves "guarantors" of 
the collection of uncollectable taxes. Accordingly, it 
would be the duty of the Attorney General to sue all 
members of the Tax Commission on their bonds for 
failme to discharge this responsibility. "Sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander." As tax collectors, mem-
bers of the Commission surely cannot claim a discrimin-
atory exception from the obligation they would impose 
upon their subordinate tax collectors. 
lt is obvious that the legislature never intended 
that a responsibility to act as a tax-collection agent 
~hould be construed as a guarantee that the taxes will 
be collectible and collected. 
As previously demonstrated, even the legislature 
could not constitutionally discriminate against vendors 
by vending machine, nor compel A to pay the debt of B. 
The regulations, therefore, must fall before the 
higher statutory and constitutional law. 
4. :B-,inally, these regidations are outside the statutory 
grant of authority to the Tax Commission. In the first 
place, the Commission is authorized only to prescribe 
"rules and regulations in conformity with this Act," 
(Section 59-15-20, UCA, 1953) and such are are "not 
in conflict with the constitution and laws of this state.'" 
(Section 59-5-46, UCA 1953). As shown, the regula-
tions under which the Tax Commission is proceeding, 
al' avplied to Hinckley, are contrary to both the laws 
and the constitution of Utah, and are, therefore, outside 
the grant of regulatory power. 
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In the second place, these regulations and the act of 
the Auditing Division are a clear attempt by this ad. 
ministrative body to exercise legislative power by dras. 
tic amendment of the Sales Tax Act. rrhey not only shift 
the legal and economic burden of and liability for the 
tax, but also change the nature of the tax from a 
transaction tax on the sale to a "Gross Receipts" or 
"Gross Income" Tax on the vendor. Under Article V. 
of the Constitution of Utah, the Commission, as an ad-
ministrative or executive body is specifically prohibited 
from the exercise of such legislative functions. Further, 
the legislature is forbidden to delegate its legislative 
authority. 
Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Com. 
( 1924 101 Utah 513, 125 Pac. 2d. 408. 
Lewis v. Utah State Tax Commission (1950) 118 
Utah 72, 218 Pac. 2d. 107 4. I 
Olson Construction Co. v. State Tax Com. (1961) l 
12 Utah 2d. 42, 361 Pac. 2d. 1112. 
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. State Tax 
Com. ( 1962) 13 Utah 2d. 113, 369 Pac. 2d. 123. 
Western Leather and Binding Co. v. State Tax 
Com. (1935) 87 Utah 227, 48 Pac. 2d. 526. 
Richard Betram & Co. v. Green, (Florida District 
Court of Appeals) 132 So. 2d. 24. 
State ex rel. Foster v. Evatt (Ohio 1944) 56 N.E. 
2d 265, Certiorari denied, 324 U. S. 878. 
It should be added that, so far as we are advised 
or have heen able to ascertain, there has never been 
presented to the Utah Supreme Court the question of 
whether, under the present Sales Tax Act, the state may 
legally and constitutionally exact from a vendor the 
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amount of the tax payable by a vendee in a case where it is 
impossible, as here, to collect the tax from the vendee. 
So far as we can ascertain, other cases using language 
to the effect that the vendor is liable for the tax which 
he failed to collect from the vendee involve facts under 
which the tax was legally and practically collectible from 
tlte vendee : the tax collector's liability arose from his 
failure to use due and reasonable diligence to perform 
a possible duty. Such cases are not in point here. 
The regulations under which the Auditing Division 
Jti proceeding are unconstitutional and void and must 
be disregarded. 
D. The Sales Tax Act itself does not and could not 
place on Hinckley as 'Vendor the absolute burden of pay-
ing the tax levied 'Upon the vendee. Such construction 
would render the statute void under the equal-protec-
tion and dite-process clauses. 
Little need be added on this point, as the principles 
and decisions above-discussed are applicable here. The 
statute, Section 59-15-5, UCA 1963, merely says that the 
vendor "shall be responsible for the collection of the 
amount of the tax imposed." It does not say that the 
vendor shall be liable for the amount of the tax imposed. 
It does not say that the vendor is a guarantor of the col-
lectible or uncollectible. The proper strict construction 
of the words used by the legislature requires the in-
terpretation that the most that is imposed upon a vendor 
is the duty to use reasonable diligence to collect the 
tax when it is collectible. It does not require Hinckley 
to collect a tax which is uncollectible because neither 
legal nor practical means of collection exist. If the 
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statute is construed to require Hineldey, as a vendor 
by machine, to perform an impossible tax, or to forfeit 
31/2 per <.'.ent of all of its receipts on small sales, it 
would clearly be unconstitutional and void as denying 
equal protection of the law and as depriving Hinckley 
of liberty and property without due process. 
However, properly interpreted, the legislation does 
not become unconstitutional and void. Under proper 
interpretation, it would not infringe upon Hinckley's 
rights, nor would Hinckley be liable here. 
The cases cited with respect to the regulations of 
the Commission attempting to saddle these burdens 
upon Hinckley would be equally applicable to the statute 1 
if the statute were to be interpreted as requiring of , 
Hinckley the things which the Tax Commission asserts 
the regulations require. 
POINT II. There is no evidence and the Commission 
has niade no finding Justifying an assessment of penalty 
and additional interest on the: 
A. Sales tax in controversy, 
B. Sales tax on vending machine sales of fiftee11 
cents and above, or, 
C. Use tax paid. 
We shall consider these three matters in inverse 
order. 
A. There is no evidence that the failure to vay the 
use tax assessed (and later paid) was intentiorlill or the 
result of negligence, and the Commission has made i1o 
finding that it was. 
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Little need be said here. Penalty may be assessed 
01ily upon an affirmative finding of negligence. Hinck-
ley nms a large operation. It hired fully-qualified help 
and gave them proper instructions to report and pay 
all taxes payable. Almost all of Hinckley's machinery 
and supplies are purchased within the state of Utah. 
When the equipment involved was purchased from out-
side the state of Utah, this fact and the significance 
thereof merely escaped the attention of those to whom 
Hinckley had entrusted these matters. As the certified 
public accountant, Mr. Stockdale, testified, in his ex-
perience and according to his knowledge, it would be an 
absolute impossibility to operate a business of the 
!'ize of Hinckley's without occasional, inadvertent slips. 
It ;just happened that this particular slip by Hinckley's 
admittedly qualified people fell in an area related to 
tax. It is submitted that no negligence and no culpabil-
ity attaches to Hinckley, and that there is no reason or 
justification for assessing penalty and additional in-
terest on the Use Tax. 
B. There is no evidence and no finding that the 
failure to pay sales tax on vending machine sales made 
for a price within taxable brackets was done with in-· 
tentional disregard of regulations or the result of negli-
qence. Here again, Hinckley acted with all due dili-
gence. The management did not entrust the matter to 
unskilled personnel or even trust its own untrained 
judgment. It sought the advice and guidance of a 
rertified public accountant and that of legal counsel. It 
omitted reporting tax only when advised by legal counsel 
that no tax was payable on these sales for the reasons 
herein reported or discussed. Legal counsel was duly 
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licensed by the Supreme Court, and no negligence 
attached to Hinckley in selecting counsel and certainh '. 
not in following the advice of counsel when received. , 
As indicated, this tax was finally paid to clarify and 
simplify the issues rather than because counsel felt that 
it was payable. Any charge of negligence in this regard 
amounts to no more than a charge that Hinckley was 
unlucky in choosing counsel who had, after consider-
ation, an opinion opposed to that of counsel for the 
Tax Commission. This is certainly not negligence. 
C. With respect to the tax in controversy, it is clear 
that if no tax is due on five and ten-cent vending 
machine sales, as above-argued, no penalty for failure 
to pay the tax can be assessed. Furthermore, even if 
the final result of the controversy over the tax should 
be adverse to Hinckley, still Hinckley proceeded with 
all due care and diligence in seeking and following the 
advise of qualified, legal counsel. Certainly it is clear 
that the legal questions discussed in the first section 
of this brief are of sufficient difficulty that Hinckley 
could not be charged with negligence in failing to know 
the law better than legal counsel. 
It should be noted that the Utah law, by requiring a 
properly supported finding of "negligence," has set a 
more exacting standard for the application of a penalty 
than that found in most other laws, which usually 
assess a penalty for mere failure to remit, without more. 
Where there is a good-faith dispute under the law. 
and where, as here, the position taken by Hinckley as 
a "drafted" tax-collector is supported by respectable 
authoritv and the opinion of legal counsel, it is sub-
mitted that there is no negligence and no justification 
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for imposing penalties. 
Monison-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization, (Wyo. 1943) 135 Pac. 2d. 927. 
In closing, perhaps it should be observed that we 
think it is universally recognized that the statutes and 
rt>gulations imposing penalties are to be very strictly 
construed against the state and very liberally in favor 
of the one against whom the penalties are directed. 
It is submitted that under such circumstances, it is 
further the law that the burden is on the Tax Commi-
sion to prove negligence by clear and convincing evidence. 
Parsons vs. C & NWR Co. 167 U.S. 447, 42 L. Ed. 
231; 
Smith vs. Capital Gas. Co., (Calif.) 64 Pac. 
258, 54 LRA 769; 
Good vs. Galveston, etc., Co. (Texas) 11 S.W. 
854, 4 LRA 801 ; 
Harrison vs. Vose, 9 How. (U.S.) 372, 13 L. ED. 
179; 
Peterson vs. State of Nebraska 112 N.W. 306, 14 
LRA (NS) 292; 
City of Belding vs. Maloney (Mich.) 103 N.W. 
2d 621. 
ft is submitted that there is no evidence of negligence. 
POINT III. The refusal of the Commission to permit 
Hinckley to inqiiire as to its policies and practices in 
assessing penalties, to determine whether it is an 
object of discrimination, denies Hinckley due process 
of lnw and equal protection of law. 
Tf the Commission's representatives have a practice 
(Jf foregiving penalties on request where the proposed de- , 
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ficiency assessment is paid up by a cowed "collector," 
but of asse::;::;ing and holding to penalties against those 
who, in good faith, resist the deficiency and demand 
their day in court, this is clearly such denial of equal 
protection of the laws and of due process of law, and such 
administrative autocracy as the courts cannot and will 
not countenance under State or Federal Constitutions. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 1, 2, 4, 
7 and 11; 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment 14. 
Dravo Contracting Co. v. James, 114 Fed. 2d 242, 
14 7 A.L.R. 135. 
The denial to Hinckley of reasonable opportunity 
to determine this fact by discovery or otherwise clearly 
denies Hinckley a fair hearing as to the penalties, and 
is a patent denial of due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the 
order of the Tax Commission should be vacated and 
the deficiency proceedings dismissed. Failing that, 
the proceedings should be remanded for a further hear-
ing on the matter of penalties, with directions to permit 
such discovery as necessary to disclose whether or not 
there is an established discriminatory practice by the 
Commission in the application of penalties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
by PA UL THA rrCHER, Partner 
FRANK S. WARNER, Associate 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts from Previous Statutes 
and 
Tax Commission Reports, Rulings and Regulations 
No. 1. Excerpt from the "Sales Tax Statute, as amen-
ded by Ch. 20, Laws of Utah, 1933, 2nd Special 
Session. 
5. Collection - Returns - Payments - Stamps -
Conditional Sales. 
Every person receiving any payment or consider-
ation upon a sale of property or service subject to the 
tax under the provisions of this act, or to whom such 
payment or consideration is payable (hereinafter called 
the vendor) shall be responsible for the collection of 
the amount of the tax imposed on said sales and shall, 
on or before the fifteenth day of each month, make a 
return to the state tax commission, for the preceding 
month and shall remit the taxes so collected to the 
state tax commission. The vendor may, if he see fit, 
collect the tax from the vendee, but in no case shall he 
collect as tax an amount (without regard to fractional 
parts of one cent) in excess of the tax computed at 
the rates prescribed by this act. (Emphasis supplied.) 
For the purpose of more efficiently securing the 
payment, collection and accounting for the taxes pro-
vided for under this act, the tax commission in its 
discretion, by proper rules and regulations, may pro-
1·iclc for the issu.ance, affixing and payment of revenue 
starnps .... 
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No. 2 Excerpt from Third Biennial Report of Tax Com-
mission, 1935-36 (Exh. 3) PP. 53, 55-56. 
THE SALES TAX 
General 
The sales tax was adopted in 1933 as an emergency 
revenue measure and became effective June 1, 1933, 
with the rate of tax at %. of 1 %, and effective August 
4, 1933, the rate was increased to 2%. The tax is pay-
able to the State by the seller, who, under the law, is 
held responsible for its collection from the purchaser, 
but who may either collect the tax, absorb it or include 
it as an addition to the price. 
The third objection is not so serious m its effect 
upon revenue, but does present some problems bet-
ween the seller and purchaser in transactions where 
the tax amounts to less than one cent. It has been found 
that most merchants collect the tax from the customer, 
and as the merchant has no means of collecting less 
than one cent, bracket systems have been adopted 
which most nearly collect the amount of tax he is re-
quired to return to the State. Under this system a custo-
mer may be required to pay a one cent tax on a twenty 
cent purchase which amounts to a 5 % tax instead of 
2%. This same customer may, however, make several 
ten cent purchases upon which no tax is paid and 
thus, considering his aggregate purchases in compari-
son with the total tax he has paid, the theory would 
be that if enough purchases were considered, the tax 
paid would not exceed a 2% rate. 
The complaints of the purchaser are: first, that in 
considering single purchases, he pays uncler the bracket 
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system, a tax greater than at the 2 % rate; second, 
that tlw merchant is collecting an excess tax. We have 
ltlade some special studies regarding the methods used 
Ii~' merchants, and although these studies are rather 
limited in their scope, we find that the larger merchants 
are <:ollecting very nearly the amount of tax that they 
are required to return to the State and that the smaller 
merchants collect less tax·. This study further shows 
that the merchant may have an under-collection in one 
department of his business and an over-collection in 
another department. In one case we found that in the 
~ale of meals and tobacco there was a considerable under-
collection, whereas in the drug department an over-
<.'Ollection existed, but in considering the total sales of 
all departments and the total tax there did not exist any 
over-collection. The small merchant operating a business 
such as a confectionery, making sales in small amounts 
and making sales of articles having a fixed or determined 
iirice, claims that it is not practical for him to collect 
the tax and that he is forced to absorb the tax. Merchants 
also complain of a customer's resistance to paying the 
sales tax, especially on transactions where the sale 
amounts to less than fifty cents. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Other states have adopted sales tax tokens, issued 
to overcome these objections usually in the denomin-
ation of one-fifth of one cent so that, under a tax at 
the 2 % rate, one token would represent the tax on 
each ten cent purchase. The use of the token enables 
the purchaser to pay very nearly the correct amount 
of tax and assists the merchant to reimburse himself 
l'or the amount of his tax liability to the State. We are 
now gathering data from the states using sales tax 
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tokens for the purpose of assisting in determining if 
this State should adopt the tokens in the administration 
of the sales tax. If we are so persuaded, it is the in-
tention of the Commission to adopt a regulation to 
permit their use. 
No. 3. Excerpt from Sales Tax Law (Sec. 5) As Amend-
ed by Ch. 112, Laws of Utah, 1937. 
Section 5. Collection--Ret1Jrns-Tokens-
Conditional Sales 
Every person receiving any payment or considera-
tion upon a sale of property or service subject to the tax 
under the provisions of this act, or to whom such pay-
ment or consideration is payable (hereinafter called 
the vendor) shall be responsible for the collection of 
the amount of the tax imposed on said sales and shall, 
on or before the fifteenth day of each month, make a 
return to the state tax commission for the preceding 
month and shall remit the taxes so collected to the state 
tax commission. The vendor shall collect the tax from 
the vendee, but in no case shall he collect as tax an 
amount (without regard to fractional parts of one cent) 
in excess of the tax computed at the rates prescribed 
by this act. .... (Emphasis supplied.) 
For the purpose of more efficiently securing the 
payment, collection and accounting for the taxes pro-
vided under this act, the tax commission in its discretion, 
by proper rules and regulations, shall provide for the 
issuance of tokens or other appropriate devices to 
facilitate collections. (Emphasis supplied.) 
No. 4. Exarpt from, Minutes of Tax Commission Meet-
ing held June 7, 1937. 
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Sales Ta.i; Ruling No. 20 
8f!BJECT: MANDATORY COLLECTION OF TAX 
Chapter 111, Laws of Utah, 1937, amends Section 
J of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 to read in 
part as follows : 
'' .... The vendor shall collect the tax from the 
vendee .... " (Emphasis in Original) 
Under the Act, as amended, the vendor is required 
to collect the tax from the vendee with respect to all 
transactions subject to tax. In all cases the tax must be 
added to the sales price and collected as a separate item. 
It will be considered a violation of the Act for 
the vendor to absorb the tax or to consider that the 
tax is included and collected as a part of the sales 
pnce. 
No. 5. Excerpt from Tax Commission's Sales Tax Reg-
ulation 57, Effective August 18, 1937. 
57 - - VENDING MACHINES, PUNCH BOARDS. 
Persons operating punch boards or vending mach-
ines are deemed to be retailers and selling the articles 
of tangible property which are disposed of in connection 
with the operation of such punch boards or vending 
machines. The total receipts from the operation of the 
above will be considered as the total selling price of 
the tang·ible personal property distributed in connect-
ion with their operation and must be reported as the 
amount of the sale subject to the tax. 
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In cases of sales made through vending machines 
and similar devices, or where sales are made under 
conditions of business such as to render impracticable 
the collection of the tax as a separate item, the Commiss-
ion will authorize the seller to pay the tax levied under 
the Sales Tax Act and waive collection of the tax from 
the customer. 
No such authority shall be granted except on app-
lication to the Commission and unless the Commission, 
after a hearing, shall find that the condition of the 
applicant's business is such as to render impracticable 
the collection of the tax in the manner otherwise pro-
vided under this Act, Effective August 18, 1937. 
No. 6. Excerpt from Tax Commission's Fourth Bi-
ennfol Report, 1937-38 (Exh. 4), pp. 34-37. 
As a result of amendments to the Act made by the 
last legislatitre providing that it is mandatory for thei 
seller to collect the tax from the purchaser and author-
izing this Commission to issue takens, a number of 
complaints raised by both sellers and purchasers against 
the tax have been overcome. This Commission adopted 
sales tax tokens in two denominations: a one mill piece 
representing the tax on a five cent purchase and a 
five mill piece representing the tax on a twenty-five 
cent purchase. The tokens were placed in use July 1, 
1937, the distribution being effected primarily through 
our branch offices and the various banks located with-
in the State. At first the tokens appeared to be some-
what of a nuisance, but as the public became accustomed 
to their use and merchants found practical methods 
of handling- and accounting for them objections rapidly 
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decreased and they now have practically become a part 
of normal business transactions. (Emphasis supplied) 
Attention is directed to an exemption in the present 
Ad for sales made by religious, charitable or eleemosy-
nary institutions when made in the conduct of their 
regular activities and functions. It would seem proper, 
rather than exempting sales made by such institutions, 
to exempt sales made to them. These institutions can, 
1with respect to their sales, collect the tax, but in case, 
of their purchases the tax becomes a direct burden 
and if it is the policy of the legislature to grant relief 
to such institutions, then it appears more proper to 
exempt purchases made by this class of institutions than 
it does to exempt their sales. (Emphasis supplied.) 
We have observed that the sales tax imposes upon 
the reporting retailer some degree of burden in meeting 
the requirements of the law. Sitch retailer, from a prac-
tical viewpoint, is acting in the capacity of an agent· 
of the State in collecting and returning the sales tax. 
He must keep proper accounts and records to reflect 
the sales tax to be paid to the State and must prepare 
and file returns, setting for th his sales and the amount 
of tax to be remitted. He is required to handle sales 
tax tokens and should be familiar with the various rules 
and regulations concerning the application of the tax. 
In many instances the seller must explain to his cust-
omer the nature of the tax or the regulation pertaining 
to certain transactions. Because of this condition we 
have, insofar as practical, endeavored to aid the retailer 
in meeting and solving his problems presented by the 
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sales tax. (Emphasis Supplied.) 
No. 7. Sales Tax Regulations Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 74 pub-
lished 1959. (Exhibit 5) 
2. Nature of Tax (Applies to sales tax only).-
This is a transaction tax imposed upon certain retail 
sales of tangible personal property made within the 
State of Utah; certain rentals and leases of tangible 
personal property, intrastate transportation of persom 
by common carriers; intrastate telephone and telegraph 
services; meals furnished by any restaurant or eating 
place; admissions to any place of amusement, enter-
tainment or recreation; all services for repairs and 
renovations of tangible personal property rendered in 
connection with other tangible personal property; cer-
tain amounts paid or charged for tourist home, hotel, 
motel, or trailer court accommodations and services; 
and all amounts paid or charged for laundry or dry 
cleaning services. There is also a tax imposed on gas, 
electricity, heat and other fuels sold or furnished for 
domestic or commercial consumption. 
The tax is not upon articles sold or furnished, hut 
upon the transaction, and the purchaser is the act1t01 
taxpayer. The vendor is charged with the duty of collect-
ing the tax f ram the znirchaser and of paying the tax 
to the state. (Approved May 27, 1959. Effective July 1, 
1959) (Emphasis supplied.) 
4. Collection of tax (A pp lies to sales tax only).-
The vendor is required to collect the tax from the 
vendee with respect to all taxable transactions. The 
tax must be added to the sales price and collected 
or charged as a separate item. The vendor is required 
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to remit to the tax connnission all tax funds in his 
po~session and is a guarantor of all amounts required 
to be collected under this act. 
5. Absorption of tax (Applies to sales tax only).-lt 
is unlawful for the vendor to absorb or in any way 
waive the collection or imposition of the tax or to con-
sider that the tax is included and collected as part of the 
sales price. 
6. Bracket system (Applies to sales and use taxes). 
-In accordance with the sales tax act of the state of 
Utah, every vendor (as defined in section 59-15-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953) shall be responsible for the 
collection from the purchaser of a tax equivalent to 
two per cent of the vendor's total sales. 
For the purpose of more efficiently securing the 
payment, collection and accounting for sales tax, the 
vendor shall use the following device to facilitate sales 
tax collections : 
Amount Tax 
$0.20 to $0.69, inclusive $0.01 
.70 to 1.19, " .02 
1.20 to 1.69, " .03 
1. 70 to 2.19, " .04 
2.20 to 2.69, " .05 
2.70 to 3.19, " .06 
Provided that for each additional 50c of purchase, 
le sales tax shall he collected thereon. 
Provided, further, that the retailer must, as here-
tofore required in the sales tax act and regulations, 
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report and pay the tax on the total amount of all taxabl~ 
sales. 
It is hereby provided that on and after the effective 
date of this regulation, sales tax tokens shall no longer 
be accepted or used by retailers for payment of sale8 
tax. (Adopted May 4, 1951. See Exhibit 9.) 
74. Vending machines, punch boards (Applies to 
sales tax only).-Persons operating punch boards 01· 
vending machines are deemed to be retailers and sell-
ing articles of tangible personal property which are 
disposed of in connection with the operation of surh 
punch boards or vending machines. 
The total receipts from the operations of the above 
will be considered as the total selling price of the tan-
gible personal property distributed in connection with 
their opPrations and must be reported as the amount 
of sale subject to tax. 
Where a vending machine is owned by a person 
other than the proprietor of a place of business in 
which the machine is placed and the person owning the 
machine has full control over the sales made by the 
machine in the collecting of the money, such owner is 
required to secure a sales tax license. One license is 
sufficient for all of the machines of one operator. A 
statement in substantially the following form must be 
affixed upon each vending machine in a conspicuous 
place: 
This machine is operated under Utah Sales 
'J1ax License No. 
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Nu. 8. Local Sales Tax Regulation No. 3. (1961) 
:i. (As amended) Tax collection schedule, 3% (App-
lies to sales and use taxes).-When the vendor is respon-
.~ible for collecting from the purchaser local sales or 
use tax of one-half of one percent in addition to state 
:sales and use tax of two and one-half percent, the 
following combined 3 % schedule is to be used to de-
termine the amount of tax to be collected: 
Amount of Sale Tax 
$0.01 to $0.14 None 
.15 to .42 $0.01 
.43 to .73 .02 
.74 to 1.12 .03 
1.13 to 1.49 .04 
1.50 to 1.83 .05 
1.84 to 2.16 .06 
For each additional amount of $1.00, state and local 
tax of 3c shall be collected. 
Although the state and local taxes are collected on 
a combined rate, they are to be computed and reported 
separately in different sections of the sales and use tax 
return. Vendors are to report and pay tax on the basis 
of net taxable sales. 
If local tax is not applicable to a transaction and is 
not collected, the above schedule is not to be used. See 
Sales Tax Regulation No. 6 for 21/2 per cent schedule 
for state tax only. (Effective July 1, 1961) 
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